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Indexation Rules, Risk aversion,
and Imperfect Information
1 Introduction
One of the main stylized facts regarding wage indexation is that it is generally
incomplete, which is ill at ease with traders being interested in real variables
only. The traditional answer to this apparent contradiction between rational
behaviour and empirical regularity has emphasized the macroeconomic prob-
lem of output stabilization: the standard results in the indexation literature
argue for a tradeo¤ between the neutralizing e¤ects of escalator clauses with
respect to nominal (demand) shocks, and the magnifying e¤ects they exert
with respect to real (supply) shocks. Hence, if welfare depends on output
stabilization and shocks can be of either type, the optimal degree of wage
indexation is in general positive but indeed incomplete (Gray, 1976; Fischer,
1977).
However, this approach faces an intrinsic contradiction, forcefully pointed
out by Azariadis (1978): optimality is typically de…ned under conditions of
certainty equivalence, which amounts to assuming risk neutrality – a frame-
work where indexation is useless in the …rst place and, strictly speaking, its
stabilization properties are immaterial. Indeed, the optimal degree of index-
ation is usally derived from minimizing a superimposed loss function, de…ned
in terms of output deviations from the certainty-equivalence equilibrium; but
in principle it should be derived on the basis of pro…t and utility maximiza-
tion, and hence risk aversion.1 In fact, escalator clauses aim at neutralizing
in‡ation risk: …rms and workers may …nd it optimal to enter contracts which
introduce some rigidities in the economy, this being the price they are will-
ing to pay for insuring themselves – even if there are only real shocks, some
degree of indexation may still be optimal (Aziariadis, 1978).2 A consequence
of the risk aversion approach is that risk averse workers require higher in-
surance, the more uncertain is the environment: higher in‡ation uncertainty
should be associated with a higher degree of indexation, which is directly
con…rmed the empirical evidence (e.g., Holland, 1986).3
1Moreover, output stabilization is not an obvious goal for bargaining between workers
and …rms. In this respect, a distinction should be drawn between the optimal indexation
rate for the private sector, and the social welfare maximizing indexation rate – unless a
risk averse policy maker is able to impose her preferences on a risk neutral society.
2Imperfect indexation may also emerge when risk sharing concerns relative prices, in
addition to the usual aggregate (real and nominal) risk sharing problem: see Danziger
(1988).
3The same e¤ect is invoked to link the increase in in‡ation with the shortening of
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In this paper we adopt the risk sharing approach, to argue that less-
than-full indexation may arise out of the informational constraints faced by
risk averse agents, and hence it can occur even in the face of purely nom-
inal shocks: the degree of indexation re‡ects the informational content of
the available price index with respect to the ‘true’ cost-of-living index, an
accurate measure of which may be di¢cult to obtain.4 Moreover, our model
predicts a link between wage indexation and in‡ation variance: given any
(actual or expected) increase in the price level, the overall nominal wage
change depends on some ‘fundamentals’ (like bargaining power, degree of
risk aversion, etc.) and the indexation mechanism as such, linking wage dy-
namics to price dynamics on top of other causes of nominal adjustment – this
‘pure’ indexation component turns out to be higher, the higher the variance
of in‡ation.
The simplest way to focus on these points is via a static, partial equi-
librium contracting model, with …xed employment: the basic issue can be
captured by concentrating exclusively on the responsiveness of wages to in-
‡ation, and assuming away the di¢culties induced bymulti-period bargaining
with renegotation, as well as those due to the indexation rate being deter-
mined jointly with wage and employment.5 No explicit distinction is made
between the real or nominal source of the in‡ation shock: what matters to
the risk averse worker is in‡ation risk in itself, and indeed most escalator
clauses fail to make this distinction – even though in a few cases some CO-
LAs do rule out oil prices from the reference price index. Finally, indexation
arises endogenously out of risk aversion, so that, in contrast with Blanchard
(1979) and Davis and Kanago (1997), there are no exogenous renegotiation
costs to justify indexation clauses.
We now present in section 2 the general form of the standard bargaining
model: maximization of the payo¤ of the bargaining unit under di¤erent
informational settings allows us to draw our general implications of optimal
escalator clauses. Section 3 gathers some concluding remarks.
contract duration (Rich and Tracy, 2000). Notice that instantaneous recontracting may
be likened to instantaneous indexation – in the limit, the distinction between the two is
somewhat blurred, as instantaneous recontracting could in principle provide full insurance
about in‡ation risk. Given renegotiation costs, indexation may then be seen as an imper-
fect but cheaper alternative, the cost of which are once and for all as standardized clauses
may be applied in most cases (and revisions of indexation rules do not appear frequent).
4The CPI typically mis-estimates the true cost-of-living index (e.g., Moulton, 1996),
while better approximations (like Fisher or Törnqvist indices) are rarely available, and
usually produced only for speci…c periods.
5A similar set of assumptions, concerning in particular …xed employment, has been
used by Woglom (1990), Ehrenberg et al. (1983), and Danziger (1988).
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2 The model
A risk neutral …rm and a risk averse worker bargain over the increase in
the nominal wage rate, given a ‘base’ real wage. The wage increase is to
be set with no knowledge of actual in‡ation – the latter is modelled as a
random variable, the distribution of which is known by both parties. If actual
in‡ation were known, nominal wage setting would clearly involve an in‡ation-
contingent arrangement, amounting to full indexation: however, this is very
rarely seen in reality (if at all), as accurate in‡ation statistics are usually
unavailable, or available with delay after wage contracts are settled.6
As realized in‡ation is not observable, the bargaining problem is to be
solved in expected terms. We do so under two di¤erent informational set-
tings. First, we take expectation over the unconditional distribution of the
in‡ation rate. Strictly speaking, this is a no indexation case: the result-
ing nominal wage adjustment depends only on the parameters of the in‡a-
tion distribution – i.e., it re‡ects the parties’ common understanding of the
in‡ation-generating mechanism. Secondly, we assume instead that an imper-
fect in‡ation signal (a change in a cost-of-living index) is available, so that
the relevant in‡ation distribution is conditioned upon it. Clearly, the opti-
mal nominal wage change is now contingent on the in‡ation signal: indeed,
speci…c in‡ation indices may be published almost continuosly.
We consider a simple e¢cient bargaining model, the outcome of which is
given by maximizing a weighted average of the parties’ objective functions.
The latter are the workers’ utility, ?
¡?
?
¢
, and the …rm’s pro…t, ¦
¡?
?
¢
, with
obvious notation: accordingly, the objective of the bargaining unit is de…ned
as
­
¡?
?
¢
= ??
¡?
?
¢
+ (1¡ ?)¦ ¡?? ¢
where the …rm is risk neutral while the worker (may be) risk averse, and
? 2 (0? 1).7
This problem can be set as one concerning rates of change, by assuming
that some real wage is given to start with, ?0 ? 0. Then ?? (the real wage
6A full-‡edged contract-theoretic explanation would notice that full indexation cannot
be incentive compatible, if the worker’s consumption basket is not freely observable by
the …rm. In the same vein, the imperfect in‡ation signal alluded to in the sequel, should
presumably re‡ect what is jointly observable by the parties. An explicit modeling of both
issues is assumed away here by our de…nition of the real wage as simply??? (so that, e.g.,
no distinction is made between the production wage and the consumption wage). Some
observations on these and related points are gathered in the last section of the paper.
7Both parties could in principle be risk averse, with no substantial e¤ects on our results.
The bargaining problem should specify outside options, here normalized to zero.
4
to be bargained upon) can be written as
?
? =
¡
1+?
1+?
¢
?0 (1)
where ? and ? measure the change of the nominal wage and the cost-of-
living adjustment, respectively – the latter is the true in‡ation rate to be
considered in setting the real wage. Hence, the bargaining unit will seek to
maximize a function ­(?? ?). We interpret ? as the choice variable, and ?
as a random variable: the parties bargain over the adjustment in nominal
wages taking the in‡ation rate as given. Notice that ?0 being an arbitrary
starting point is consistent with this approach, as the ex-post real wage will
in general di¤er from the optimal one.
In order to work out extreme cases …rst, suppose the realization of the
in‡ation rate is known. Then the optimal wage change is simply given by
the schedule ?? (?), obtained from the maximization of ­(?? ?) with respect
to ?: this state contingent solution is the optimal ex post adjustment to
in‡ation.
On the other hand, if the parties’ information concerns only the distri-
bution of ?, the optimal wage adjustment is some function of a vector of
parameters of the distribution itself – ??(??), say – obtained from the maxi-
mization of ?(­(?? ?)), where ?(¢) is the expectation operator with respect
to the random variable ?. This is the unindexed wage increase, bargained
upon given the available information: it depends on no realized variables,
but only on the parameters of the distribution of in‡ation rates.
Our main contention is that available price indices, to which nominal
wage increases are typically linked, convey only partial information about
the in‡ation rate. We view the indexing rule as arising from maximizing a
function ?(­(?? ?)j?), where ? is an in‡ation signal, the correlation of which
with ? is not perfect: the parties will settle at a wage increase ??(?; ??? ??),
where ?? is the vector of parameters of the distribution of ?. The degree of
indexation is measured along ??(?; ??? ??) as a function of ?: we see indexa-
tion as setting ex ante a rule linking the wage increase to a realized in‡ation
signal. If ? is concave and ¦ linear in ??? , we know that
?(­(?(?)? ?)) ? ?(­(?(?; ??? ??)? ?)) ? ?(­(?(??)? ?)) (2)
Indeed, the value of information is always positive to a risk averse agent (e.g.,
La¤ont 1976): the bargaining unit would prefer ex ante to know the realized
in‡ation rate, and set the wage rate accordingly. There would be an ex ante
incentive to adjust the wage increase to true in‡ation (if that were possible),
and there is anyway an ex ante incentive to link the wage increase to an
imperfect in‡ation signal. Both incentives arise out of risk aversion – there is
trivially no incentive towards indexation when both parties are risk neutral.
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2.1 A general setting
In this section we elaborate upon our general setting by making the only a
priori assumptions that the bargaining unit maximand function is concave
in ??? . We consider the full information case …rst: as mentioned above,
the bargaining unit will settle at a wage change ?? , which satis…es
?? = ??(?) = argmax? f­(?? ?)g (3)
Under de…nition (1), the degree of indexation is measured by the elasticity
of the wage increase with respect to the appropriate measure of in‡ation.8
Under standard concavity conditions, it will generally be the case that
?? ´
???
??
1+ ?
1+ ??
= 1 (4)
an obvious implicit di¤erentiation result.9
We now take the unindexed wage increase: this is the nominal wage
change ?? which satis…es
?? = ??(??) = argmax? f?(­(?? ?))g
A general property is that ?(­(?? ?)) can be written as a function of ? and
the distribution parameter vector ??. For the purpose of this section, we
take a second order Taylor-approximation around ? = ?(?) ´ ?. Given the
variance ? (?) = ?2, we have:
?(­(?? ?)) »= ­(?? ?) + ?
2
2
?2­(?? ?)
??2
Similarly to equation (4) above, ?? obeys
?? ´
???
??
1+ ?
1+ ??
= 1 (5)
while it is obviously independent of the realized in‡ation rate, ?.
8This de…nition is implicit in Davis and Kanago (1997), who de…ne the rate of increase
? of the nominal wage by (1 + ?) = (1 + ?)(1 + ??), with ? nominal wage growth net
of indexation, ? in‡ation, and ? indexation: the elasticity of ? with respect to ? is thus
equal to or less than one, as ? · 1.
9This is a straightforward implication of the parties being interested in real variables
only, and ?(1 + ?) = ?? (? = ?? ?); it says nothing on the absolute nominal wage change
(which depends on the bargaining strength ? and the real wage ?0).
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Finally, the indexed wage change will be
?? = ??(??? ??? ?) = argmax? f?(­(?? ?)j?)g (6)
We can write ?(­(?? ?)j?) as a function of ? and ??; to a second order
approximation, with ?(?j?) = ?? and ? (?j?) = ?2?, we have
?(­(?? ?)j?) »= ­(?? ??) +
?2?
2
?2­(?? ??)
??2 (7)
to be maximized to yield ?? as the optimal wage increase under indexation.
Again we have b?? ´ ?????? 1+ ??1+ ?? = 1 (8)
However, the actual degree of indexation is measured by the elasticity of
?? with respect to ? (and not ??). Using (8) and the fact that ?????? =
(???????)(??????),
?? ´
???
??
1+ ?
1+ ??
=
???
??
1+ ?
1+ ??
(9)
which will be lower than one, whenever so is the elasticity of (1 + ??) with
respect to (1 + ?), and the value of which depends only on the stochastic
structure of the model.
2.2 The model with normal distribution
So far we have made no assumption on the distributions of ? and ?. We now
assume these to be normal, ? » ?(?? ?2) and ? » ?(?? ?2).10 This allows us
to take advantage of a well known property: if ? is the unconditional mean
of the index ?, and ?2 its unconditional variance, it will be the case that
?? = ?+
???
?2 (?¡?) (10)
where ??? is the covariance between ? and ?. As a consequence, (9) becomes
?? =
(1+ ?)???
(1+ ?)?2 + (?¡?)??? (11)
10This assumption on the distribution of in‡ation rates within a given time period is
quite common. The one-period in‡ation rate is often modeled as a linear transformation
of current and past money growth rates and normally distributed shocks: this does not
prevent the possibility of complex dynamics (or even nonstationarity) of the in‡ation rate.
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We now assume that ?, the observable change in the CPI or PPI, be an
unbiased predictor of ? (i.e., ? = ?). We also assume ?2 = ?2?2, ? ? 0, so
that ? » ?(?? ?2?2). Under these assumptions, (11) can be written as
?? =
(1+ ?)?
1+ ??+ (1¡ ?)? (12)
where ? = ?????2 = ???, with ? 2 [¡1?+1] the correlation coe¢cient be-
tween ? and ?. As a result, partial or over-indexation can arise in (12) out
of the sheer stochastic structure of the model, depending on the correlation
between actual in‡ation and the in‡ation index. Indeed, it is easily checked
that ?? · 1 as ? · 1. Incomplete indexation is usually observed, which is
consistent with assuming ? ? 1. In the Appendix we present a formal argu-
ment to the e¤ect that, at least in simple cases, ? ? 1 out of the properties
of the distributions of ? and ?. In this case incomplete indexation emerges
also when the correlation between ? and ? is perfect. Moreover, it is clear by
inspection that the degree of indexation is linked to the variance of in‡ation.
As to the latter remark, it should be noticed that according to Davis and
Kanago (1997) (DK) the nominal wage change should depend on the relative
variability of in‡ation, i.e. (in our notation) on ??(1+?). Now consider e.g.
the derivation of (5): the bargaining unit’s maximand can be written as:
­(?? ?) + ?
2
2
?2­(?? ?)
??2 = ­
³
1+?
1+??0
´
+
1
2
[(1+ ?)??0]2­00
³
1+?
1+??0
´
(5’)
where ? = ??(1 + ?) is an index of relative variability. For any given ?0,
the optimal nominal wage increase from maximizing (5’) will have the form
?? = ??(???) – in that sense, the wage increase does indeed depend on
relative variability. However, we are interested in a pure indexation e¤ect,
which at the optimum equals one, independently of in‡ation variance:11 the
unit-elasticity results depends only on the parties being interested in real
variables. Indeed, pure indexation has to be 100%, if traders are rational
and in‡ation is known or expected with certainty. By the same token, when
the in‡ation signal is ? the optimum involves a unit elasticity of ?? with
respect to ??: it is because of (10) that pure indexation (i.e., the elasticity
with respect to ?) turns out to depend on in‡ation variance, since the latter
a¤ects the reliability of ? as an in‡ation signal.
As a …nal observation, it may be worthwhile to enquiry about how the
model behaves with a CARA speci…cation of the workers’ utility function
11In the DK model this e¤ect is implicitly measured by the elasticity of ?? with respect
to ?, and would amount to ? = 1 (see f.note 7). In that model, however, the indexation
parameter ? is exogenously given: the nominal wage growth net of (and given) indexation
is determined as a function of ?, ?, and ? (and depends only on ? for ? = 1).
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– which, under the normality assumption, obviously delivers a lognormal
maximization problem which can be explictly solved. When this is done
(most conveniently with a continuous-time speci…cation), the resulting wage
change as of equation (6) will take the simple form
?? = ? + ?? (6’)
where ? = ??+(1¡?)??. Hence, the unindexed component ? is a weighted
average of the wage change which would have been reached without index-
ation, and a term ? re‡ecting risk aversion and the bargaining power ?; it
tends to coincide with ?? as ? tends to zero: indexation is useless when
the in‡ation signal gives no useful information. On the other hand, ? will
never tend to one (i.e., indexation to 100 percent), so long as the variance
of ? is greater than that of ?.12 The explicit CARA solution may also help
clarifying the role of risk aversion: the bargaining unit’s expected surpluses
with and without indexation di¤er by an amount which is increasing with
the coe¢cient of risk aversion.13 It should be noticed that the degree of in-
dexation ? depends only on the stochastic structure of the model, i.e. on the
informativeness of the in‡ation signal; by contrast, the weight of the indexed
component has to depend in general on risk aversion. Indeed, it is always
optimal to link the wage increase to an in‡ation signal, so long as the latter
is informative; however, this amounts to taking some risk, the compensation
of which through a noncontingent share in wage adjustment not surprisingly
re‡ects risk aversion (as well as bargaining power).
3 Concluding remarks
Treating indexation as the optimal reaction of risk averse traders to in‡ation
risk in the presence of an in‡ation signal, o¤ers some scope for possible exten-
sions. In particular, while the traditional macroeconomic literature focuses
on complete vs incomplete indexation, focusing on the informational content
12Under this respect, a notable property is ?(??) = ?? ¡ 12?2?2?20?2 = ?(?? ) + 12(1¡
?2)?2?20?2 (where ? is risk aversion): quite naturally, ?(??) = ?? for ? = 0 and ?(??) =
?(?? ) for ? = 1, while 1 ? ? ? 0 implies ?? ? ?(??) ? ?(?? ).
13Indeed, following (2), we get ?(­(?(?; ??? ??)? ?)¡?(­(?(??)? ?) = 12(1¡?)??0?2?2
where ?? = (?? ?2) and ?? = (?? ???)? This is positive only if ? ? 1 (the …rm has some
bargaining power).When …rms have a say in setting the wage increase, some of the burden
of insuring workers is shifted onto the in‡ation signal ?: as ? tends to 1 there is no incentive
towards indexation, as workers will be insured anyway. Also, this incentive is stronger,
the higher the degree ? of risk aversion and the variance of in‡ation: it is because of risk
aversion in risky situations that indexation makes sense.
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of price indices suggests a distinction between perfect and imperfect index-
ation. The latter distinction hinges on the fact that the typical observable
CPI holds for the ‘representative consumer’, but speci…c (classes of) con-
sumers (sorted out, e.g., by income level, or geographical residence) have in
fact di¤erent consumption bundles, and indexation to the CPI is necessarily
imperfect. In practice, we do observe consumer in‡ation indices, speci…c for
(quite large) classes of households: these approximate the actual in‡ation
rate experienced by a given worker, by referring to an ‘average’ bundle of
goods which is typical of the class to which the household observably be-
longs. Our approach might then in principle explain the di¤erence between
changes in CPI (overall in‡ation) and in speci…c cost-of-living indices, as
the two may di¤er.14 Modeling explicitly this di¤erence may give one addi-
tional reason, beyond that put forth in this paper (but in the same spirit)
for explicit indexation never being 100 percent: if we distinguish between
the …rm’s and the worker’s relevant in‡ation rates (concerning their speci…c
production and consumption bundles), the informational content of the in-
‡ation signal ? considered in the bargaining process (possibly a weighted
average of a CPI and a PPI, or the GDP de‡ator) would be limited to what
is jointly observable: full insurance of the worker’s real income would not be
incentive compatible. A related point, within an implicit contract model, has
been raised by Danziger (1988). He postulates the existence of a real relative
shock, which changes the marginal rate of transformation between the prod-
uct and the consumption wages, in a framework where the labor contract
is indexed to the aggregate price level. As the labor contract is o¤ered by
the …rm, which cares about the product wage, the proposed indexation rule
is less than complete, because (due to the existence of aggregate real and
nominal shocks), the price level is on average an imperfect indicator of the
real relative shock. Clearly, as already pointed out, the e¤ects of real relative
shocks on the indexation rule cannot be addressed in our model, as we do
not distinguish between product- and consumption-wage.
On the other hand, our approach may also account for a well known em-
pirical regularity: among dependent workers, indexation is more likely for
low-level wages than for high-level wages.Traditional macroeconomic analy-
sis posits a uniform indexation rate for all workers; at the same time, the
prevailing informal explanation for di¤erent intra-workers indexation is that
wealthier households typically hold a higher-than-average proportion of non-
human wealth, which is an important collateral – rich households are less
liquidity constrained, and accordingly require less insurance in the form of
14Clearly, the same reasoning applies to risk averse …rms which bargain over the PPI,
an index referred to the typical …rm while any given …rm operates within a given industry.
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wage indexation.15 By linking risk aversion and nominal wage change, our
model might o¤er a di¤erent explanation (a straightforward, preference-based
one being that risk aversion might not be increasing in income). Because of
the overwhelming weight of the low income classes and the resulting asym-
metric distribution of income, the correlation between the changes in ‘true’
household’s index and the changes in the o¢cially published (and hence
observable) consumer price index is arguably higher for low-wage earners:
high-wage earners are more likely to have a consumption bundle signi…cantly
di¤erent from the o¢cial consumption basket. And indeed our model predicts
that the adjustment of the nominal wage to the observable average in‡ation
index rises with the correlation of the index with ‘true’ in‡ation – i.e., the
change in the true household’s cost-of-living index. This e¤ect is strength-
ened by a rise in average in‡ation, as luxury goods exhibit a greater relative
in‡ation volatility than inferior or subsistence goods: if the same indexation
package were to be o¤ered to high and low wage earners, the consumption
bundle of the rich household should be changed more frequently (e.g., Deaton
and Muellbauer 1980, p.175) – these adjustment and renegotiation costs (not
considered in our model) should raise the cost of indexation and hence make
it less likely.
Finally, the model can in principle account for di¤erent price indices be-
ing formally included in the bargained-upon wage change – depending on the
informational content of any price index with respect to the bundle of com-
modities the worker is interested in. One implication (to be taken up next
in our research agenda) is that the cost of escalator clauses should include
the distortions induced by imperfect indexation. In particular, given that
the latter is inevitable due to sampling costs, this distortion is presumably
linked to the position of the representative worker within the overall income
distribution.
15Note however that this explanation actually predicts that low-wealth households are
typically dependent workers, which is a di¤erent empirical point.
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Appendix
In this Appendix we show that, at least in simple cases, it is reasonable to
assume ? ? 1, i.e. that the variance of the in‡ation index ? is greater than
that of ‘true in‡ation’ ?. Let us de…ne ? as the simple arithmetic average of
the ? in‡ation rates ?? of the goods consumed (or produced) in the economy,
whereas the in‡ation signal ? is the average of ? of the ? in‡ation rates
(? ? ?):
? = 1?
?X
?=1
??
? = 1?
?X
?=1
??
which implies ? =
Q?
?=1 ?
1??
? , where ?? is the price level of good ?. To
simplify calculations assume that the ?? are random variables with mean ?
and variance ?2, for all ?, and that ???(??? ??) = ?? ¸ 0 for all ? and ?, ? 6= ?.
The variances ? (?) and ? (?) are, respectively:
? (?) = 1?2?
Ã ?X
?=1
??
!
=
??2 + ?(?¡ 1)??
?2
? (?) = 1?2?
Ã ?X
?=1
??
!
=
??2 +?(?¡ 1)??
?2
The condition ? (?) ¡ ? (?) ? 0 thus becomes ??(? ¡ ?)(?2 + ??) ? 0,
clearly veri…ed for ?? ¸ 0.
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